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Abstract
The CFR framework has been a powerful tool for solving large-scale extensive-form games
in practice. However, the theoretical rate at which past CFR-based algorithms converge to the
Nash equilibrium is on the order of O(T−1/2), where T is the number of iterations. In contrast,
first-order methods can be used to achieve a O(T−1) dependence on iterations, yet these methods
have been less successful in practice. In this work we present the first CFR variant that breaks the
square-root dependence on iterations. By combining and extending recent advances on predictive
and stable regret minimizers for the matrix-game setting we show that it is possible to leverage
“optimistic” regret minimizers to achieve a O(T−3/4) convergence rate within CFR. This is
achieved by introducing a new notion of stable-predictivity, and by setting the stability of each
counterfactual regret minimizer relative to its location in the decision tree. Experiments show that
this method is faster than the original CFR algorithm, although not as fast as newer variants, in
spite of their worst-case O(T−1/2) dependence on iterations.
1. Introduction
Counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) (Zinkevich et al., 2007) and later variants such as Monte-Carlo
CFR (Lanctot et al., 2009), CFR+ (Tammelin et al., 2015), and Discounted CFR (Brown & Sandholm,
2019), have been the practical state-of-the-art in solving large-scale zero-sum extensive-form games (EFGs)
for the last decade. These algorithms were used as an essential ingredient for all recent milestones in the
benchmark domain of poker (Bowling et al., 2015; Moravcˇı´k et al., 2017; Brown & Sandholm, 2017b).
Despite this practical success all known CFR variants have a significant theoretical drawback: their worst-
case convergence rate is on the order of O(T−1/2), where T is the number of iterations. In contrast to this,
there exist first-order methods that converge at a rate of O(T−1) (Hoda et al., 2010; Kroer et al., 2015;
2018b). However, these methods have been found to perform worse than newer CFR algorithms such as
CFR+, in spite of their theoretical advantage (Kroer et al., 2018b;a).
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In this paper we present the first CFR variant which breaks the square-root dependence on the number
of iterations. By leveraging recent theoretical breakthroughs on “optimistic” regret minimizers for the
matrix-game setting, we show how to set up optimistic counterfactual regret minimizers at each information
set such that the overall algorithm retains the properties needed in order to accelerate convergence. In
particular, this leads to a predictive and stable variant of CFR that converges at a rate of O(T−3/4).
Typical analysis of regret-minimization leads to a convergence rate of O(T−1/2) for solving zero-sum
matrix games. However, by leveraging the idea of optimistic learning (Chiang et al., 2012; Rakhlin &
Sridharan, 2013a;b; Syrgkanis et al., 2015; Wang & Abernethy, 2018), Rakhlin and Sridharan show in a
series of papers that it is possible to converge at a rate of O(T−1) when leveraging cancellations that occur
due to the optimistic mirror descent (OMD) algorithm (Rakhlin & Sridharan, 2013a;b). Syrgkanis et al.
(2015) build on this idea, and introduce the optimistic follow-the-regularized-leader (OFTRL) algorithm;
they show that even when the players do not employ the same algorithm, a rate of O(T−3/4) can be
achieved as long as each algorithm belongs to a class of algorithms that satisfy a stability criterion and
leverage predictability of loss inputs. We build on this latter generalization. Because we can only perform
the optimistic updates locally with respect to counterfactual regrets we cannot achieve the cancellations
that leads to a rate of O(T−1); instead we show that by carefully instantiating each counterfactual regret
minimizer it is possible to maintain predictability and stability with respect to the overall decision-tree
structure, thus leading to a convergence rate of O(T−3/4). In order to achieve these results we introduce
a new variant of stable-predictivity, and show that each local counterfactual regret minimizer must have
its stability set relative to its location in the overall strategy space, with regret minimizers deeper in the
decision tree requiring more stability.
In addition to our theoretical results we investigate the practical performance of our algorithm on several
poker subgames from the Libratus AI which beat top poker professionals (Brown & Sandholm, 2017b). We
find that our CFR variant coupled with the OFTRL algorithm and the entropy regularizer leads to better
convergence rate than the vanilla CFR algorithm with regret matching, while it does not outperform the
newer state-of-the-art algorithm Discounted CFR (DCFR) (Brown & Sandholm, 2019). This latter fact is not
too surprising, as it has repeatedly been observed that CFR+, and the newer and faster DCFR, converges at
a rate better than O(T−1) for many practical games of interest, in spite of the worst-case rate of O(T−1/2).
The reader may wonder why we care about breaking the square-root barrier within the CFR framework. It is
well-known that a convergence rate of O(T−1) can be achieved outside the CFR framework. As mentioned
previously, this can be done with first-order methods such as the excessive gap technique (Nesterov, 2005)
or mirror prox (Nemirovski, 2004) combined with a dilated distance-generating function (Hoda et al., 2010;
Kroer et al., 2015; 2018b). Despite this, there has been repeated interest in optimistic regret minimization
within the CFR framework, due to the strong practical performance of CFR algorithms. Burch (2017)
tries to implement CFR-like features in the context of O(T−1) FOMs and regret minimizers, while Brown
& Sandholm (2019) experimentally tries optimistic variants of regret minimizers in CFR. We stress that
these prior results are only experimental; our results are the first to rigorously incorporate optimistic regret
minimization in CFR, and the first to achieve a theoretical speedup.
Notation. Throughout the paper, we use the following notation when dealing with Rn. We use 〈x, y〉 to
denote the dot product x>y of two vectors x and y. We assume that a pair of dual norms ‖ · ‖, ‖ · ‖∗ has
been chosen. These norms need not be induced by inner products. Common examples of such norm pairs
are the `2 norm which is self dual, and the `1, `∞ norms, which are are dual to each other. We will make
explicit use of the 2-norm: ‖x‖2 :=
√〈x, x〉.
2. Sequential Decision Making and EFG Strategy Spaces
A sequential decision process can be thought of as a tree consisting of two types of nodes: decision nodes
and observation nodes. The set of all decision nodes is denoted as J , and the set of all observation nodes
with K. At each decision node j ∈ J , the agent chooses a strategy from the simplex ∆nj of all probability
distributions over the set Aj of nj = |Aj | actions available at that decision node. An action is sampled
according to the chosen distribution, and the agent then waits to play again. While waiting, the agent might
receive a signal (observation) from the process; this possibility is represented with an observation node. At
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a generic observation point k ∈ K, the agent might receive nk signals; the set of signals that the agent can
observe is denoted as Sk. The observation node that is reached by the agent after picking action a ∈ Aj
at decision point j ∈ J is denoted by ρ(j, a). Likewise, the decision node reached by the agent after
observing signal s ∈ Sk at observation point k ∈ K is denoted by ρ(k, s). The set of all observation points
reachable from j ∈ J is denoted as Cj := {ρ(j, a) : a ∈ Aj}. Similarly, the set of all decision points
reachable from k ∈ K is denoted as Ck := {ρ(k, s) : s ∈ Sk}. To ease the notation, sometimes we will use
the notation Cja to mean Cρ(j,a). A concrete example of a decision process is given in the next subsection.
At each decision point j ∈ J in a sequential decision process, the decision xˆj ∈ ∆nj of the agent
incurs an (expected) linear loss 〈`j , xˆj〉. The expected loss throughout the whole process is therefore∑
j∈J pij〈`j , xˆj〉, where pij is the probability of the agent reaching decision point j, defined as the product
of the probability with which the agent plays each action on the path from the root of the process to j.
In extensive-form games where all players have perfect recall (that is, they never forget about their past
moves or their observations), all players face a sequential decision process. The loss vectors {`j} are defined
based on the strategies of the opponent(s) as well as the chance player. However, as already observed
by Farina et al. (2019), sequential decision processes are more general and can model other settings as well,
such as POMDPs and MDPs when the decision maker conditions on the entire history of observations and
actions.
2.1. Example: Sequential Decision Process for the First Player in Kuhn Poker
As an illustration, consider the game of Kuhn poker (Kuhn, 1950). Kuhn poker consists of a three-card
deck: king, queen, and jack. Each player first has to put a payment of 1 into the pot. Each player is then
dealt one of the three cards, and the third is put aside unseen. A single round of betting then occurs:
• Player 1 can check or bet 1.
– If Player 1 checks Player 2 can check or raise 1.
∗ If Player 2 checks a showdown occurs.
∗ If Player 2 raises Player 1 can fold or call.
· If Player 1 folds Player 2 takes the pot.
· If Player 1 calls a showdown occurs.
– If Player 1 raises Player 2 can fold or call.
∗ If Player 2 folds Player 1 takes the pot.
∗ If Player 2 calls a showdown occurs.
If no player has folded, a showdown occurs where the player with the higher card wins. The sequential
decision process the Player 1 is shown in Figure 1, where denotes an observation point. In that example,
we have: J = {X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6}; n0 = 1; nj = 2 for all j ∈ J \ {X0}; AX0 = {start},
AX1 = AX2 = AX3 = {check, raise}, AX4 = AX5 = AX6 = {fold, call}; Cρ(X0,start) = {X1, X2, X3},
Cρ(X1,raise) = ∅, Cρ(X3,check) = {X6}; etc.
2.2. Sequence Form for Sequential Decision Processes
The expected loss for a given strategy, as defined in Section 2, is non-linear in the vector of decisions
variables (xˆj)j∈J . This non-linearity is due to the product pij of probabilities of all actions on the path to
from the root to j. We now present a well-known alternative representation of this decision space which
preserves linearity.
The alternative formulation is called the sequence form. In the sequence-form representation, the simplex
strategy space at a generic decision point j ∈ J is scaled by the decision variable leading of the last
action in the path from the root of the process to j. In this formulation, the value of a particular action
represents the probability of playing the whole sequence of actions from the root to that action. This allows
each term in the expected loss to be weighted only by the sequence ending in the corresponding action.
The sequence form has been used to instantiate linear programming (von Stengel, 1996) and first-order
methods (Hoda et al., 2010; Kroer et al., 2015; 2018b) for computing Nash equilibria of zero-sum EFGs.
There is a straightforward mapping between a vector of decisions (xˆj)j∈J , one for each decision point, and
3
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X0
X3
X6
X2
X5
X1
X4
start
fold call fold call fold call
check raise check raise check raise
jack queen king
check raise check raise check raise
Figure 1. The sequential decision process for the first player in the game of Kuhn poker. denotes an observation
point; small dots represents the end of the decision process.
its corresponding sequence form: simply assign each sequence the product of probabilities in the sequence.
We will let X4 denote the sequence-form representation of a vector of decisions (xˆj)j∈J . Likewise, going
from a sequence-form strategy x4 ∈ X4 to a corresponding vector of decisions (xˆj)j∈J can be done by
dividing each entry (sequence) in x4 by the value x4pj where pj is the entry in x
4 corresponding to the
unique last action that the agent took before reaching j.
Formally, the sequence-form representationX4 of a sequential decision process can be obtained recursively,
as follows:
• At every observation point k ∈ K, we let
X4k := X
4
j1
×X4j2 × · · · ×X4jnk , (1)
where {j1, j2, . . . , jnk} = Ck are the children decision points of k.
• At every decision point j ∈ J , we let
X4j :=


λ1
...
λnj
λ1xk1
...
λnjxknj

: (λ1, . . . , λn) ∈ ∆nj , xk1 ∈ X4k1 , xk2 ∈ X
4
k2
, . . . , xknj ∈ X
4
knj

, (2)
where {k1, k2, . . . , knj} = Cj are the children observation points of j.
The sequence form strategy space for the whole sequential decision process is then X4r , where r is the root
of the process. Crucially, X4 is a convex and compact set, and the expected loss of the process is a linear
function over X4.
With the sequence-form representation the problem of computing a Nash equilibriun in an EFG can be
formulated as a bilinear saddle-point problem (BSPP). A BSPP has the form
min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
x>Ay, (3)
where X and Y are convex and compact sets. In the case of extensive-form games, X = X4 and Y = Y 4
are the sequence-form strategy spaces of the sequential decision processes faced by the two players, and A
is a sparse matrix encoding the leaf payoffs of the game.
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2.3. Notation when dealing with the extensive form
In the rest of the paper, we will make heavy use of the sequence form and its inductive construction given
in (12) and (13). We will consistently denote sequence-form strategies with a triangle superscript. As we
have already observed, vectors that pertain to the sequence-form have one entry for each sequence of the
decision process, that is one entry for pair (j, a) where j ∈ J , a ∈ Aj . Sometimes, we will need to slice a
vector v and isolate only those entries that refer to all decision points j′ and actions a′ ∈ Aj′ that are at
or below some j ∈ J ; we will denote such operation as [v]↓j . Similarly, we introduce the syntax [v]j to
denote the subset of nj = |Aj | entries of v that pertain to all actions a ∈ Aj at decision point j ∈ J .
3. Stable-Predictive Regret Minimizers
In this paper, we operate within the online learning framework called online convex optimization (Zinkevich,
2003). In particular, we restrict our attention to a modern subtopic: predictive (also often called optimistic)
regret minimization (Chiang et al., 2012; Rakhlin & Sridharan, 2013a;b).
As usual in this setting, a decision maker repeatedly plays against an unknown environment by making a
sequence of decisions x1, x2, · · · ∈ X ⊆ Rn, where the set X of feasible decisions for the decision maker
is convex and compact. The evaluation of the outcome of each decision xt is 〈`t, xt〉, where `t ∈ X is
a convex loss vector, unknown to the decision maker until after the decision is made. The peculiarity of
predictive regret minimization is that we also assume that the decision maker has access to predictions
m1,m2, . . . of what the loss vectors `1, `2, . . . will be. In summary, by predictive regret minimizer we
mean a device that supports the following two operations:
• it provides the next decision xt+1∈X given a prediction mt+1 of the next loss vector and
• it receives/observes the convex loss vectors `t used to evaluate decision xt.
The learning is online in the sense that the decision maker’s (that is, device’s) next decision, xt+1, is based
only on the previous decisions x1, . . . , xt, observed loss vectors `1, . . . , `t, and the prediction of the past
loss vectors as well as the next one m1, . . . ,mt+1.
Just as in the case of a regular (that is, non-predictive) regret minimizer, the quality metric for the predictive
regret minimizer is its cumulative regret, which is the difference between the loss cumulated by the sequence
of decisions x1, . . . , xT and the loss that would have been cumulated by playing the best-in-hindsight
time-independent decision xˆ. Formally, the cumulative regret up to time T is
RT :=
T∑
t=1
〈`t, xt〉 −min
x˜∈X
{
T∑
t=1
〈`t, x˜〉
}
. (4)
We introduce a new class of predictive regret minimizers whose cumulative regret decomposes into a
constant term plus a measure of the prediction quality, while maintaining stability in the sense that the
iterates x1, . . . , xT change slowly.
Definition 1 (Stable-predictive regret minimizer). A predictive regret minimizer is (κ, α, β)-stable-predictive
if the following two conditions are met:
• Stability. The decisions produced change slowly:
‖xt+1 − xt‖ ≤ κ ∀ t ≥ 1. (5)
• Prediction bound. For all T , the cumulative regret up to time T is bounded according to
RT ≤ α
κ
+ βκ
T∑
t=1
‖`t −mt‖2∗. (6)
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In other words, small prediction errors only minimally affect the regret accumulated by the device. If,
in particular, the prediction mt matches the loss vector `t perfectly for all t, the cumulative regret
remains asymptotically constant.
Our notion of stable-predictivity is similar to the Regret bounded by Variation in Utilities (RVU) property
given by Syrgkanis et al. (2015), which asserts that
RT ≤ α′ + β′
T∑
t=1
‖`t − `t−1‖2∗ − γ′
T∑
t=1
‖xt − xt−1‖2. (RVU)
However, there are several important differences:
• Syrgkanis et al. (2015) assume that mt = `t−1; this explains the term ‖`t − `t−1‖2∗ in (RVU) instead
of ‖`t −mt‖2∗ in (6). One of the reason why we do not make assumptions on mt is that, unlike in
matrix games, we will need to use modified predictions for each local regret minimizer, since we need
to predict the local counterfactual loss.
• Our notion ignores the cancellation term −γ′∑ ‖xt − xt−1‖2; instead, we require the stabilty
property (5).
• The coefficients in the regret bound (6) are forced to be inversely proportional, and tied to the choice
of the stability parameter κ. Syrgkanis et al. (2015) show that same correlation holds for the optimistic
follow-the-regularized leader, but they don’t require it in their definition of the RVU property.
Syrgkanis et al. (2015) show that their optimistic follow-the-regularized-leader (OFTRL) algorithm, as well
as the variant of the mirror descent algorithm presented by Rakhlin & Sridharan (2013a), satisfy (RVU). In
Section 3.2 we show that OFTRL also satisfies stable-predictivity.
3.1. Relationship with Bilinear Saddle-Point Problems
In this subsection we show how stable-predictive regret minimization can be used to solve a BSPP such as a
Nash equilibrium problem in two-player zero-sum extensive-form games with perfect recall (Sections 2
and 2.2). The solutions of (3) are called saddle points. The saddle-point residual (or gap) ξ of a point
(x¯, y¯) ∈ X × Y , defined as
ξ := max
yˆ∈Y
x¯>Ayˆ −min
xˆ∈X
xˆ>Ay¯,
measures how close (x¯, y¯) is to being a saddle point (the lower the residual, the closer).
It is known that regular (non-predictive) regret minimization yields an anytime algorithm that produces a
sequence of points (x¯T , y¯T ) ∈ X ×Y whose residuals are ξT = O(T−1/2). Syrgkanis et al. (2015) observe
that in the context of matrix games (i.e., when X and Y are simplexes), RVU minimizers that also satisfy
the stability condition (5) can be used in place of regular regret minimizers to improve the convergence rate
to O(T−3/4). In what follows, we show how to extend the argument to stable-predictive regret minimizers
and general bilinear saddle-point problems beyond Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum matrix games.
A folk theorem explains the tight connections between low regret and low residual (Cesa-Bianchi & Lugosi,
2006). Specifically, by setting up two regret minimizers (one for X and one for Y) that observe loss vectors
given by `tX := −Ayt, `tY := A>xt, the profile of average decisions(
1
T
T∑
t=1
xt,
1
T
T∑
t=1
yt
)
∈ X × Y (7)
has residual ξ bounded from above according to
ξ ≤ 1
T
(RTX +R
T
Y).
6
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Hence, by letting the predictions be defined as mtX := `
t−1
X ,m
t
Y := `
t−1
Y , and assuming that the predictive
regret minimizers are (κ, α, β)-stable-predictive, we obtain that the residual ξ of the average decisions (7)
satisfies
Tξ ≤ 2α
κ
+ βκ
T∑
t=1
‖−Ayt +Ayt−1‖2∗
+ βκ
T∑
t=1
‖A>xt −A>xt−1‖2∗
≤ 2α
κ
+ β‖A‖2opκ
(
T∑
t=1
‖xt−xt−1‖2 +
T∑
t=1
‖yt−yt−1‖2
)
≤ 2α
κ
+ 2βT‖A‖2opκ3,
where the first inequality holds by (6), the second by noting that the operator norm ‖ · ‖op of a linear function
is equal to the operator norm of its transpose, and the third inequality by the stability condition (5). This
shows that if the stability parameter κ of the two stable-predictive regret minimizers is Θ(T−1/4), then
the saddle point residual is ξ = O(T−3/4), an improvement over the bound ξ = O(T−1/2) obtained with
regular (that is, non-predictive) regret minimizers.
3.2. Optimistic Follow the Regularized Leader
Optimistic follow-the-regularized-leader (OFTRL) is a regret minimizer introduced by Syrgkanis et al.
(2015). At each time t, OFTRL outputs the decision
xt = argmin
x˜∈X
{〈
x˜,mt +
T−1∑
t=1
`t
〉
+
1
η
R(x˜)
}
, (8)
where η > 0 is a free constant and R(·) is a 1-strongly convex regularizer with respect to the norm
‖ · ‖. Furthermore, let ∆R := maxx,y∈X {R(x) − R(y)} denote the diameter of the range of R, and let
∆` := maxt max{‖`t‖∗, ‖mt‖∗} be the maximum (dual) norm of any loss vector or prediction thereof.
A theorem similar to that of Syrgkanis et al. (2015, Proposition 7), which was obtained in the context of the
RVU property, can be shown for the stable-predictive framework:
Theorem 1. OFTRL is a 3∆`(η,∆R, 1)-stable-predictive regret minimizer.
We give a proof of Theorem 1 the appendix. When the loss vectors are further assumed to be non-negative,
it can be shown that OFTRL is 2∆`(η,∆R, 1)-stable-predictive, where we have substituted a factor of 2
rather than the factor of 3 in Theorem 1.
4. CFR as Regret Decomposition
In this section we offer some insights into CFR, and discuss what changes need to be made in order to
leverage the power of predictive regret minimization. CFR is a framework for constructing a (non-predictive)
regret minimizer R4 that operates over the sequence-form strategy space X4 of a sequential decision
process. In accordance with Section 2.3, we denote the decision produced by R4 at time t as x4,t; the
corresponding loss functions is denoted as `4,t.
One central idea in CFR is to define a localized notion of loss: for all j ∈ J , CFR constructs the following
linear counterfactual loss function ˆ`t,◦j : ∆
nj → R. Intuitively, the counterfactual loss ˆ`t,◦j (xj) of a local
strategy xj ∈ ∆nj measures the loss that the agent would face were the agent allowed to change the strategy
at decision point j only. In particular, ˆ`t,◦j (xj) is the loss of an agent that follows the strategy xj instead of
x4,t at decision point j, but otherwise follows the strategy x4,t everywhere else. Formally,
ˆ`t,◦
j : xj = (xja1 , . . . xjanj ) 7→ 〈[`4,t]j , xj〉+
∑
a∈Aj
xja ∑
j′∈Cja
〈[`4,t]↓j′ , [x4,t]↓j′〉
 . (9)
7
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Since ˆ`t,◦j is a linear function, it has a unique representation as a counterfactual loss vector ˆ`
t
j , defined as
ˆ`t,◦
j (xj) = 〈ˆ`tj , xj〉 ∀xj ∈ ∆nj . (10)
With this local notion of loss function, a corresponding local notion of regret for a sequence of decisions
xˆ1j , . . . , xˆ
T
j , called the counterfactual regret, is defined for each decision point j ∈ J :
RˆTj :=
T∑
t=1
〈ˆ`tj , xˆtj〉 − min
x˜j∈∆nj
T∑
t=1
〈ˆ`tj , x˜j〉.
Intuitively, RˆTj represents the difference between the loss that was suffered for picking xˆ
t
j ∈ ∆nj and
the minimum loss that could be secured by choosing a different strategy at decision point j only. This is
conceptually different from the definition of regret ofR4, which instead measures the difference between
the loss suffered and the best loss that could have been obtained, in hindsight, by picking any strategy from
the whole strategy space, with no extra constraints.
With this notion of regret, CFR instantiates one (non-stable-predictive) regret minimizer Rˆj for each
decision point j ∈ J . Each local regret minimizer Rˆj operates on the domain ∆nj , that is, the space of
strategies at decision point j only. At each time t,R4 prescribes the strategy that, at each information set
j, behaves according to the decision of Rˆj . Similarly, any loss vector `4,t input to R4 is processed as
follows: (i) first, the counterfactual loss vectors {ˆ`tj}j∈J , one for each decision point j ∈ J , are computed;
(ii) then, each Rˆj observes its corresponding counterfactual loss vector ˆ`tj .
Another way to look at CFR and counterfactual losses is as an inductive construction over subtrees. When a
loss function relative to the whole sequential decision process is received by the root node, inductively each
node of the sequential decision process does the following:
• If the node receiving the loss vector is an observation node, the incoming loss vector is partitioned and
forwarded to each child decision node. The partition of the loss vector is done so as to ensure that only
entries relevant to each subtree are received down the tree.
• If the node receiving the loss vector is a decision node, the incoming loss vector is first forwarded as-is
to each of the child observation points, and then it is used to construct the counterfactual loss vector ˆ`tj
which is input into Rˆj .
This alternative point of view differs from the original one, but has been recently used by Farina et al. (2018;
2019) to simplify the analysis of the algorithm. When viewed from the above point of view, CFR is
recursively building—in a bottom-up fashion—regret minimizers for each subtree starting from child
subtrees.
In accordance with our convention (Section 2.3), we denoteR4v , for v ∈ J ∪ K, the regret minimizer that
operates on X4v obtained by only considering the local regret minimizers in the subtree rooted at vertex v of
the sequential decision process. Analogously, we will denote with R4,Tv the regret ofR4v up to time T , and
with `4,tv the loss function enteringR4v at time t. In accordance with the above construction, we have that
`4,tk = [`
4,t
j ]↓k ∀k ∈ Cj , and `4,tj = [`4,tk ]↓j ∀j ∈ Ck. (11)
Finally, we denote the decisions produced by R4v at time t as x4,tv . As per our discussion above, the
decisions produced byR4 are tied together inductively according to
∀k ∈ K, x4,tk = (x4,tj1 , . . . , x4,tjnk ), where {j1, . . . , jnk} = Ck, (12)
and
∀j ∈ J , x4,tj =
(
xˆtj , xˆ
t
ja1x
4,t
ρ(j,a1)
, . . . , xˆtjanj
x4,tρ(j,anj )
)
where {a1, . . . , anj} = Aj . (13)
The following two lemmas can be easily extracted from Farina et al. (2018):
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Lemma 1. Let k ∈ K be an observation node. Then, R4,Tk =
∑
j∈Ck
R4,Tj .
Proof. By definition of R4,Tk ,
R4,Tk =
T∑
t=1
〈`4,tk , x4,tk 〉 − min
x˜4k ∈X4k
T∑
t=1
〈`4,tk , x˜4k 〉.
By using (12) and (11), we can break the dot products and the minimization problem into independent parts,
one for each j ∈ Ck:
R4,Tk =
∑
j∈Ck
T∑
t=1
〈`4,tj , x4,tj 〉 −
∑
j∈Ck
min
x˜4j ∈X4j
T∑
t=1
〈`4,tj , x˜4j 〉
=
∑
j∈Ck
(
T∑
t=1
〈`4,tj , x4,tj 〉 − min
x˜4j ∈X4j
T∑
t=1
〈`4,tj , x˜4j 〉
)
=
∑
j∈Ck
R4,Tj ,
as we wanted to show.
Lemma 2. Let j ∈ J be a decision point. Then, R4,Tj ≤ RˆTj + max
k∈Cj
R4,Tk .
Proof. By definition of R4,Tj ,
R4,Tj =
T∑
t=1
〈`4,tj , x4,tj 〉 − min
x˜4j ∈X4j
T∑
t=1
〈`4,tj , x˜4j 〉.
By combining (13) and (11), we can break the dot products and the minimization problem into independent
parts, one for each k ∈ Cj , as well as a part that depends solely on xˆj :
R4,Tj =
T∑
t=1
〈[`4,tj ]j , xˆtj〉+∑
a∈Aj
k=ρ(j,a)
xˆtja〈`4,tk , x4,tk 〉

− min
x˜j∈∆nj

(
T∑
t=1
〈[`4,tj ]j , x˜j〉
)
+
∑
a∈Aj
k=ρ(j,a)
x˜ja
(
min
x˜4k ∈X4k
T∑
t=1
〈`4,tk , x˜4k 〉
)
=
T∑
t=1
〈[`4,tj ]j , xˆtj〉+∑
a∈Aj
k=ρ(j,a)
xˆtja〈`4,tk , x4,tk 〉

− min
x˜j∈∆nj

(
T∑
t=1
〈[`4,tj ]j , x˜j〉
)
+
∑
a∈Aj
k=ρ(j,a)
x˜ja
(
−R4,Tk +
T∑
t=1
〈`4,tk , x4,tk 〉
)
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≤
T∑
t=1
〈[`4,tj ]j , xˆtj〉+∑
a∈Aj
k=ρ(j,a)
xˆtja〈`4,tk , x4,tk 〉

− min
x˜j∈∆nj

T∑
t=1
〈[`4,tj ]j , x˜j〉+∑
a∈Aj
k=ρ(j,a)
x˜ja〈`4,tk , x4,tk 〉

+ maxx˜j∈∆nj
∑
a∈Aj
x˜jaR
4,T
k ,
where the equality follows by the definition of R4,Tk , and the inequality follows from breaking the
minimization of a sum into a sum of minimization problems. By identifying the difference between the first
two terms as the counterfactual regret RˆTj (that is, the regret of Rˆj up to time T ), we obtain
R4,Tj ≤ RˆTj + max
x˜j∈∆nj
∑
k∈Cj
x˜jaR
4,T
k = Rˆ
T
j + max
k∈Cj
R4,Tk ,
as we wanted to show.
The two lemmas above do not make any assumption about the nature of the (localized) regret minimizers
Rˆj , and therefore they are applicable even when the Rˆj are predictive or, specifically, stable-predictive.
5. Stable-Predictive Counterfactual Regret Minimization
Our proposed algorithm behaves exactly like CFR, with the notable difference that our local regret minimiz-
ers Rˆj are stable-predictive and chosen to have specific stability parameters. Furthermore, the predictions
mtj for each local regret minimizer Rˆj are chosen so as to leverage the predictivity property of the regret
minimizers. Given a desired value of κ∗ > 0, by choosing the stability parameters and predictions as we
will detail later, we can guarantee thatR4 is a (κ∗, O(1), O(1))-stable-predictive regret minimizer.1
5.1. Choice of Stability Parameters
We use the following scheme to pick the stability parameter of Rˆj . First, we associate a scalar γv to each
node v ∈ J ∪ K of the sequential decision process. The value γr of the root decision node is set to κ∗, and
the value for each other node v is set relative to the value γu of their parent
γv :=

γu
2
√
nu
if u ∈ J
γu√
nu
if u ∈ K.
(14)
The stability parameter of each decision point j ∈ J is chosen according to
κj :=
γj
2
√
njBj
, (15)
where Bj is an upper bound on the 2-norm of any vector in X
4
j . A suitable value of Bj can be found by
recursively using the following rules:
∀k ∈ K, Bk =
√∑
j∈Ck
B2j
∀j ∈ J , Bj =
√
1 + max
k∈Cj
B2k (16)
1Throughout the paper, our asymptotic notation is always with respect to the number of iterations T .
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At each decision point j, any stable-predictive regret minimizer that is able to guarantee the above stability
parameter can be used. For example, one can use OFTRL where the stepsize η is chosen appropriately. For
example, assuming without loss of generality that all loss vectors involved have (dual) norm bounded by
1/3, we can simply set the stepsize η of the local OFTRL regret minimizer Rˆj at decision point j to be
η = κj .
5.2. Prediction of Counterfactual Loss Vectors
Let m4,t be the prediction received by R4, concerning the future loss vector `4,t. We will show how
to process the prediction and produce counterfactual prediction vectors mˆtj (one for each decision point
j ∈ J ) for each local stable-predictive regret minimizer Rˆj .
Following the construction of the counterfactual loss functions defined in (9), for each decision point j ∈ J
we define the counterfactual prediction function mˆt,◦j : ∆
nj → R as
mˆt,◦j : ∆
nj 3 xj = (xja1 , . . . , xjanj ) 7→ 〈[m4,t]j , xj〉+
∑
a∈Aj
xja ∑
j′∈Cja
〈[m4,t]↓j′ , [x4,t]↓j′〉
 .
Observation. It important to observe that the counterfactual prediction function mˆtj depends on the
decisions produced at time t in the subtree rooted at j. In other words, in order to construct the prediction
for what loss Rˆj will observe after producing the decision xtj , we use the “future” decisions xtja from the
subtrees below j ∈ J .
Similarly to what is done for the counterfactual loss function, we define the counterfactual loss prediction
vector mˆtj , as the (unique) vector in Rnj such that
mˆt,◦j (xj) = 〈mˆtj , xj〉 ∀xj ∈ ∆nj . (17)
5.3. Proof of Correctness
We will prove that our choice of stability parameters (14) and (localized) counterfactual loss predictions (17)
guarantee thatR4 is a (κ∗, O(1), O(1))-stable-predictive regret minimizer. Our proof is by induction on the
sequential decision process structure: we prove that our choices yield a (γv, O(1), O(1))-stable-predictive
regret minimizer in the sub-sequential decision process rooted at each possible node v ∈ J ∪ K. For
observation nodes v ∈ K the inductive step is performed via Lemma 3, while for decision nodes v ∈ J the
inductive step is performed via Lemma 4.
We will prove both Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 with respect to the 2-norm. This does not come at the cost of
generality, since all norms are equivalent on finite-dimensional vector spaces, that is, for every choice of
norm ‖ · ‖, there exist constants m,M > 0 such that for all x, m‖x‖ ≤ ‖x‖2 ≤M‖x‖.
Lemma 3. Let k ∈ K be an observation node, and assume that R4j is a (γj , O(1), O(1))-stable-
predictive regret minimizer over the sequence-form strategy space X4j for each j ∈ Ck. Then, R4k
is a (γk, O(1), O(1))-stable-predictive regret minimizer over the sequence-form strategy space X
4
k .
Proof. By hypothesis, for all j ∈ Ck we have
R4,Tj ≤
O(1)
γj
+O(1)γj
T∑
t=1
‖`4,tj −m4,tj ‖22 (18)
and
‖x4,tj − x4,t−1j ‖2 ≤ γj , (19)
where x4,tj is the decision output byR4j at time t.
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Substituting (18) into the regret bound of Lemma 1:
R4,Tk ≤ O(1)
∑
j∈Ck
1
γj
+O(1)
∑
j∈Ck
T∑
t=1
γj‖`4,tj −m4,tj ‖22
≤ O(1)n
3/2
k
γk
+O(1)
γk√
nk
T∑
t=1
∑
j∈Ck
‖`4,tj −m4,tj ‖22
=
O(1)
γk
+O(1)γk
T∑
t=1
‖`4,tk −m4,tk ‖22 (20)
where the second inequality comes from substituting the value γj = γk/
√
nk as per (14), and the equality
comes from the fact that the `4,tj and m
4,t
j form a partition of the vectors `
4,t
k and m
4,t
k , respectively.
We now analyze the stability properties ofR4k :
‖x4,tk − x4,t−1k ‖2 =
√∑
j∈Ck
‖x4,tj − x4,t−1j ‖22 ≤
√∑
j∈Ck
γ2j = γk,
where the first equality follows from (1), the inequality holds by (19) and the second equality holds by
substituting the value γj = γk/
√
nk as per (14). This shows thatR4k is γk-stable. Combining this with the
predictivity bound (20) above, we obtain the claim.
Lemma 4. Let j ∈ J be a decision node, and assume that R4k is a (γk, O(1), O(1))-stable-predictive
regret minimizer over the sequence-form strategy space X4k for each k ∈ Cj . Suppose further that Rˆj is a
(κj , O(1), O(1))-stable-predictive regret minimizer over the simplex ∆nj . Then,R4j is a (γk, O(1), O(1))-
stable-predictive regret minimizer over the sequence-form strategy space X4j .
Proof. By hypothesis, for all k ∈ Cj we have
R4,Tk ≤
O(1)
γk
+O(1)γk
T∑
t=1
‖`4,tk −m4,tk ‖22 (21)
and
‖x4,tk − x4,t−1k ‖2 ≤ γk. (22)
We substitute (21) into the regret bound of Lemma 2. The key observation is that the loss vector—and their
predictions—entering the subtree rooted at k (k ∈ Cj) are simply forwarded from j; with this, we obtain:
RT4j ≤ RˆTj +
O(1)
γk
+O(1)γk
T∑
t=1
‖`4,tj −m4,tj ‖22. (23)
On the other hand, by hypothesis Rˆj is a (κj , O(1), O(1))-stable-predictive regret minimizer. Hence,
RˆTj ≤
O(1)
κj
+O(1)κj
T∑
t=1
‖ˆ`tj − mˆtj‖22
=
O(1)
γj
+O(1)γj
T∑
t=1
‖`4,tj −m4,tj ‖22, (24)
where the equality comes from the definition of κj (Equation (15)) and the fact that
‖ˆ`tj − mˆtj‖22 ≤
∑
k∈Cj
‖x4,tk ‖22 · ‖`4,tk −m4,tk ‖22
≤ ‖`4,tj −m4,tj ‖22
∑
k∈Cj
B2k
= O(1)‖`4,tj −m4,tj ‖22.
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By substituting (24) into (23) and noting that γk = O(1)γj , we obtain
R4,Tj ≤
O(1)
γj
+O(1)γj
T∑
t=1
‖`4,tj −m4,tj ‖22,
which establishes the predictivity ofR4j .
To conclude the proof, we show thatR4j has stability parameter γj . To this end, note that by (2)
‖x4,tj − x4,t−1j ‖22 =
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
a∈Aj
xˆtjax
4,t
ja
−
∑
a∈Aj
xˆt−1ja x
4,t−1
ja
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
+ ‖xˆtj − xˆt−1j ‖22
≤ ‖xˆtj − xˆt−1j ‖22
1 + 2 ∑
k∈Cj
‖x4,tk ‖22
+ 2 ∑
k∈Ck
‖x4,tk − x4,t−1k ‖22
≤ 2njB2j ‖xˆtj − xˆt−1j ‖22 + 2
∑
k∈Ck
‖x4,tk − x4,t−1k ‖22,
where we have used the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and the definition of Bj (Equation 16). By using the
stability of Rˆj , that is ‖xˆtj − xˆt−1j ‖22 ≤ κ2j = γ2j /(4njB2j ), as well as the hypothesis (22) and (14):
‖x4,tj − x4,t−1j ‖2 ≤
γ2j
2
+ 2
∑
k∈Cj
(
γj
2
√
nj
)2
=
γ2j
2
+ 2nj
(
γj
2
√
nj
)2
= γ2j .
Hence,R4j has stability parameter γj as we wanted to show.
Putting together Lemma 3 and Lemma 4, and using induction on the sequential decision process structure,
we obtain the following formal statement.
Corollary 1. Let κ∗ > 0. If:
1. Each localized regret minimizer Rˆj is (κj , O(1), O(1))-stable-predictive and produces decisions over
the local (simplex) action space ∆nj , where κj is as in (15); and
2. Rˆj observes the counterfactual loss prediction mˆtj as defined in (17); and
3. Rˆj observes the counterfactual loss vectors ˆ`tj as defined in (10),
then R4 is a (κ∗, O(1), O(1))-stable-predictive regret minimizer that operates over the sequence-form
strategy space X˜ .
By combining the above result with the arguments of Section 3.1, we conclude that by constructing two
(Θ(T 1/4), O(1), O(1))-stable-predictive regret minimizers, one per player, using the construction above,
we obtain an algorithm that can approximate a Nash equilibrium and at time T the average strategy produces
an O(T−3/4)-Nash equilibrium in a two-player zero-sum game.
6. Experiments
Our techniques are evaluated in the benchmark domain of heads-up no-limit Texas hold’em poker (HUNL)
subgames. In HUNL, there are two players P1 and P2 that each start the game with $20,000. The position
of the players switches after each hand. The players alternate taking turns and may choose to either fold,
call, or raise on their turn. Folding results in the player losing and the money in the pot being awarded
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to the other player. Calling means the player places a number of chips in the pot equal to the opponent’s
share. Raising means the player adds more chips to the pot than the opponent’s share. There are four betting
rounds in the game. A round ends when both players have acted at least once and the most recent player has
called. Players cannot raise beyond the $20,000 they start with. All raises must be at least $100 and at least
as larger as any previous raise in that round.
At the start of the game P1 must place $100 in the pot and P2 must place $50 in the pot. Both players are
then dealt two cards that only they observe from a 52-card deck. A round of betting then occurs starting
with P2. P1 will be the first to act in all subsequent betting rounds. Upon completion of the first betting
round, three community cards are dealt face up. After the second betting round is over, another community
card is dealt face up. Finally, after that betting round one more community card is revealed and a final
betting round occurs. If no player has folded then the player with the best five-card poker hand, out of their
two private cards and the five community cards wins the pot. The pot is split evenly if there is a tie.
The most competitive agents for HUNL solve portions of the game (referred to as subgames) in real time
during play (Brown & Sandholm, 2017a; Moravcˇı´k et al., 2017; Brown & Sandholm, 2017b; Brown et al.,
2018). For example, Libratus solved in real time the remainder of HUNL starting on the third betting
round. We conduct our experiments on four open-source subgames solved by Libratus in real time during
its competition against top humans in HUNL.2 Following prior convention, we use the bet sizes of 0.5× the
size of the pot, 1× the size of the pot, and the all-in bet for the first bet of each round. For subsequent bets
in a round, we consider 1× the pot and the all-in bet.
Subgames 1 and 2 occur over the third and fourth betting round. Subgame 1 has $500 in the pot at the
start of the game while Subgame 2 has $4,780. Subgames 3 and 4 occur over only the fourth betting
round. Subgame 1 has $500 in the pot at the start of the game while Subgame 4 has $3,750. We measure
exploitability in terms of the standard metric: milli big blinds per game (mbb/g), which is the number of big
blinds (P1’s original contribution to the pot) lost per hand of poker multiplied by 1,000 and is the standard
measurement of win rate in the related literature.
We compare the performance of three algorithms: vanilla CFR (i.e. CFR with regret matching; labeled
CFR in plots), the current state-of-the-art algorithm in practice, Discounted CFR (Brown & Sandholm,
2019) (labeled DCFR in plots), and our stable-predictive variant of CFR with OFTRL at each decision point
(labeled OFTRL in plots). For OFTRL we use the stepsize that the theory suggests in our experiments on
subgames 3 and 4 (labeled OFTRL theory). For subgames 1 and 2 we found that the theoretically-correct
stepsize is much too conservative, so we also show results with a less-conservative parameter found through
dividing the stepsize by 10, 100, and 1000, and picking the best among those (labeled OFTRL tuned). For
all games we show two plots: one where all algorithms use simultaneous updates, as CFR traditionally
uses, and one where all algorithms use alternating updates, a practical change that usually leads to better
performance.
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Figure 2. Convergence rate with iterations on the x-axis, and the exploitability in mbb. All algorithms use simultaneous
updates.
2https://github.com/CMU-EM/LibratusEndgames
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Figure 3. Convergence rate with iterations on the x-axis, and the exploitability in mbb. All algorithms use simultaneous
updates.
Figure 2 shows the results for simultaneous updates on subgames 2 and 4, while Figure 3 for games 1
and 3. In the smaller subgames 3 and 4 we find that OFTRL with the stepsize set according to our theory
outperforms CFR: in subgame 4 almost immediately and significantly, in subgame 3 only after roughly 800
iterations. In contrast to this we find that in the larger subgames 1 and 2 the OFTRL stepsize is much too
conversative, and the algorithm barely starts to make progress within the number of iterations that we run.
With a moderately-hand-tuned stepsize OFTRL beats CFR somewhat significantly. In all games DCFR
performs better than OFTRL, and also significantly better than its theory predicts. This is not too surprising,
as both CFR+ and the improved DCFR are known to significantly outperform their theoretical convergence
rate in practice.
Figure 4 shows the results for alternating updates on subgames 2 and 4, while games 1 and 3 are given in
Figure 5. In the alternating-updates setting OFTRL performs worse relative to CFR and DCFR. In subgame
1 OFTRL with stepsizes set according to the theory slightly outperforms CFR, but in subgame 2 they have
near-identical performance. In subgames 3 and 4 even the manually-tuned variant performs worse than
CFR, although we suspect that it is possible to improve on this with a better choice of stepsize parameter. In
the alternating setting DCFR performs significantly better than all other algorithms.
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Figure 4. Convergence rate with iterations on the x-axis, and the exploitability in mbb. All algorithms use alternating
updates.
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Figure 5. Convergence rate with iterations on the x-axis, and the exploitability in mbb. All algorithms use alternating
updates.
7. Conclusions
We developed the first variant of CFR that converges at a rate better than T−1/2. In particular we extend
the ideas of predictability and stability for optimistic regret minimization on matrix games to the setting
of EFGs. In doing so we showed that stable-predictive simplex regret minimizers can be aggregated to
form a stable-predictive variant of CFR for sequential decision making, and we showed that this leads to
a convergence rate of O(T−3/4) for solving two-player zero-sum EFGs. Our result makes the first step
towards reconciling the gap between the theoretical rate at which CFR converges, and the rate at which
O(T−1) first-order methods converge.
Experimentally we showed that our CFR variant can outperform CFR on some games, but that the choice
of stepsize is important, while we find that DCFR is faster in practice. An important direction for future
work is to find variants of our algorithm that still satisfy the theoretical guarantee and perform even better in
practice.
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A. Stable-predictivity of OFTRL
We offer a proof of Theorem 8.
First, we introduce the following argmin-function:
x˜ : L 7→ argmin
x∈X
{
〈x, L〉+ 1
η
R(x)
}
. (25)
Furthermore, let Lt :=
∑t
τ=1 `
τ . With this notation, the decisions produced by OFTRL, as defined in (8),
can be expressed as xt = x˜(Lt−1 +mt).
Continuity of the argmin-function. The first step in the proof is to study the continuity of the argmin-
function x˜. Intuitively, the role of the regularizer R is to smooth out the linear objective function 〈·, L〉. So,
it seems only reasonable to expect that, the higher the constant that multiplies R, the less the argmin x˜(L)
is affected by small changes of L. In fact, the following holds:
Lemma 5. The argmin-function x˜ is η-Lipschitz continuous with respect to the dual norm, that is
‖x˜(L)− x˜(L′)‖ ≤ η‖L− L′‖∗.
Proof. The variational inequality for the optimality of x˜(L) implies〈
L+
1
η
∇R(x˜(L)), x˜(L′)− x˜(L)
〉
≥ 0. (26)
Symmetrically for x˜(L′), we find that〈
L′ +
1
η
R(x˜(L′)), x˜(L)− x˜(L′)
〉
≥ 0. (27)
Summing inequalities 26 and 27, we obtain
1
η
〈∇R(x˜(L))−∇R(x˜(L′)), x˜(L)− x˜(L′)〉 ≤ 〈L′ − L, x˜(L)− x˜(L′)〉 .
Using strong convexity of R(·) on the left-hand side and the generalized Cauchy-Schwarz inequality on the
right-hand side, we obtain
1
η
‖x˜(L)− x˜(L′)‖2 ≤ ‖x˜(L)− x˜(L′)‖ ‖L− L′‖∗,
and dividing by ‖x˜(L)− x˜(L′)‖ we obtain the Lipschitz continuity of the argmin-function x˜.
A direct consequence of Lemma 5 is the following corollary, which measures the stability (small step size)
of the decisions output by OFTRL:
Corollary 2. At each time t, the iterates produced by OFTRL satisfy ‖xt − xt−1‖ ≤ 3η∆`.
Proof.
‖xt − xt−1‖ = ∥∥x˜(Lt−1 +mt)− x˜(Lt−2 +mt−1)∥∥
≤ η‖`t−1 +mt −mt−1‖∗ ≤ 3η∆`,
where the first inequality holds by Lemma 5 and the second one by definition of ∆` and the triangle
inequality.
The rest of the proof, specifically the predictivity parameters α and β of OFTRL follow directly from the
proof of Theorem 19 in the appendix of Syrgkanis et al. (2015).
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